
























Research Unit for Statistical
and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)
Hi-Stat
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitatchi Tokyo, 186-8601 Japan
http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
March 2009
Income Risk, Consumption Inequality, and
Macroeconomy in Japan
Tomoaki Yamada






In this paper, using an OLG model with heterogeneous households, we investi-
gate economic inequality in the recent decades in Japan. We decompose the causes
of economic inequality into macroeconomic factors and a demographic factor, and
demonstrate that the earning inequality in the model replicates the actual evolu-
tion of inequality in Japan. Based on a counterfactual simulation, we demonstrate
that time-varying macroeconomic factors play an important role in the evolution of
economic inequality. In particular, we show that the low growth rate of total factor
productivity in the 1990s in Japan limited the dispersion of economic inequality.
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11 Introduction
The life cycle permanent income hypothesis (LC-PIH) is a key concern when considering
the consumption of households. According to the LC-PIH, income inequality measured
at one period does not necessarily reﬂect economic inequality over the life cycle. Since
income inequality includes temporary variation in income, even if income inequality rises,
consumption inequality may not rise when households are prepared for such a temporary
income shock. Therefore, to investigate economic inequality, we need to simultaneously
consider the characteristics of income inequality and consumption inequality. Households
face various idiosyncratic risks on labor income, such as career success/failure, a bonus
cut, and unemployment, all of which generate income inequality.1 In addition to income
risk, the macroeconomic environment, including technical change and factor prices, may
also aﬀect economic inequality through households’ decision making.
In this paper, we consider the following questions: what kinds of factors aﬀect the
evolution of economic inequality and how big their impacts are? In addition to the
idiosyncratic income risks that households face, many factors cause macroeconomic in-
equality. To investigate the mechanism of economic inequality, we decompose the causes
into two factors: (i) macroeconomic factors and (ii) the demographic factor. The ﬁrst
factor to aﬀect economic inequality is time-varying macroeconomic variables, such as
the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate, labor share, and interest rate.2 The
1The characteristics of income risks have direct implications for policy making. If the income shock
is temporary, opening insurance markets or risk sharing within the family may be included in economic
policy. On the other hand, if the shock is permanent, a diﬀerent policy may be required. For example,
Genda et al. (2007) show that cohorts who enter the economy in recession receive a negative shock on life
time-income. This is a typical permanent income shock, which cannot be shared through market trans-
action. In such a case, to improve household welfare, the government needs to introduce a redistribution
policy.
2R´ ıos-Rull and Santaeul` alia-Llopis (2008) showed the labor share as volatile and countercyclical with
the TFP. They ﬁnd that the bivariate speciﬁcation of productivity shock (TFP) and redistributive shock
(labor share), generate the observed dynamics of the business cycle in the US. We include the time-
2Japanese economy is a good example in which to consider the relationship between
macroeconomic factors and economic inequality, because Japan has experienced large
booms and major recessions. Moreover, there have been several substantial changes in
macroeconomics variables. For example, as in Table 1, the TFP growth rate in Japan
in the 1990s was extremely low. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) demonstrate that a stan-
dard neoclassical growth model with calibrated parameters could explain Japan’s deep
recession, including the so-called lost decade of the 1990s.3 Many subsequent papers
have been published that investigate the lost decade using a dynamic general equilib-
rium framework. Chen et al. (2006,2007) and Braun et al. (2007) construct a general
equilibrium model and explain the history of Japanese saving rates, based on macroeco-
nomic factors and demographic change. If macroeconomic factors explain the change in
the saving rate, then the same may be true of economic inequality. Thus, we examine
economic inequality to explain the Japanese economy using the same approach. Sec-
ond, empirical researches, such as Ohtake and Saito (1998), have pointed out that the
dispersion of economic inequality in the Japanese economy in 1980s is largely due to
population aging. As we show later, income and consumption inequality rises by age.
Therefore, if the proportion of middle and old households increase due to aging, then ob-
served total economic inequality, measured by variance of logarithm or Gini coeﬃcient,
also appears to increase. Even when considering economic inequality with a dynamic
general equilibrium model, we cannot ignore the eﬀect of the demographic factor.
Our analysis is at the cross roads of two kinds of literature. The ﬁrst is quantitative
macroeconomics research on the Japanese economy after Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
As stated above, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) show, using a standard neoclassical growth
varying labor share as macroeconomic factors, to consider whether the reallocation of labor earners and
capital earners aﬀect economic inequality.
3In Kehoe and Prescott (2007), and in addition to Hayashi and Prescott (2002), many other re-
searchers investigate deep recessions in several countries, based on the dynamic general equilibrium
framework. See also Cole and Ohanian (1999).
3model, that the time variation of TFP growth, and the reduction in work hours, have
a great impact on the lost decade. Moreover, Chen et al. (2006,2007) and Braun et al.
(2007) extend their results to explain the history of Japan’s saving rate. We consider our
research as an extension of this literature, because it investigates the second moment in
the model. In the existing literature, many authors using the general equilibrium model
explain macroeconomic variables, such as GDP or the saving rate (ﬁrst moments)o f
the Japanese economy. We consider economic inequality (variance or second moments)
using quantitative analysis. The second is empirical research on household consump-
tion/saving decision. In particular, our approach is similar to that of Heathcote et al.
(2004,2008), who investigated the link between income risk and consumption inequal-
ity in the US. Since there are many researches on this topic, particularly in the US.,
we review this literature in the next section. Generally, modeling a stochastic income
risk process requires detailed microdata for a long period.4 If panel data is available, it
will be possible to investigate the nature of economic inequality, and, in particular, to
determine whether the idiosyncratic risks are aﬀected by business cycles. Heathcote et
al. (2004) decompose the property of income shock, using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). However, there are no comparable panel data for Japan.5 Instead,
our approach in this paper is as follows. Based on a dynamic general equilibrium model
in which the LC-PIH holds, we generate simulated economic inequality paths after con-
trolling some factors. In other words, we decompose the income/consumption inequality
into explained and unexplained components, through counterfactual simulations.
To include the impact of demographic change, we construct an overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) model with long-living households. The details of the model are as
4An incomplete list includes Abowd and Card (1989), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Blundell and Pre-
ston (1998), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2006), Guvenen (2007), Heathcote et al. (2004,2005,2008),
and Storesletten et al. (2004b).
5Using long-term income tax statistics, Moriguchi and Saez (2007) investigate Japanese income in-
equality over 100 years. Since they depend on income tax statistics, they were unable consider consump-
tion inequality.
4follows. There are many households with diﬀerent age groups, who make decisions on
consumption and saving. In each cohort, a continuum of households exists and they
face idiosyncratic income risk. Although they are identical before entering the econ-
omy, idiosyncratic income risks occur. As a result, in their middle and old age, the
households diﬀer in their wealth, labor supply, and consumption. Aggregating the het-
erogeneous households, we consider a general equilibrium of the model. By including a
demographic structure and exogenous macroeconomic variables, we calibrate our model
to the Japanese economy and use it as an experimental tool.
Our results are as follows. First, using the OLG model with calibrated parameters,
the macroeconomic variables such as the interest and saving rate (ﬁrst moments), and
income/consumption inequality over life cycle, are well replicated between 1980 and
2000. Second, our model explain the time path of earning inequality in recent decades.
Third, it is diﬃcult to explain consumption inequality using the model, particularly in
the 1980s. On the basis of counterfactual experiments, we ﬁnd that earning, income, and
consumption inequalities are reduced by the low TFP growth rate in the lost decade,
although the legally restricted reduction in work hours in late the 1980s increases income
inequality. Fourth, although the demographic factor gives rise to the positive trend of
earning inequality, as empirical research shows, the macroeconomic factors also con-
tribute to a positive trend of inequality. Lastly, we ﬁnd that preference change, and the
credibility of the social security system, may be causes of recent rises in consumption
inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, before constructing
our dynamic general equilibrium model, we begin by reviewing empirical facts in Japan,
and we deﬁne the income risks, that are applied in our model. In Section 3, we construct
an OLG model with heterogeneous households and idiosyncratic income risks. In Section
4, we calibrate the parameters for the Japanese economy. In Section 5, we discuss income
and consumption inequality in Japan that is based on the numerical results. In Section
56, we conﬁrm the sensitivity of our analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Facts on Earning, Income and Consumption
Inequality in Japan
2.1 Economic Inequality in Japan
Before constructing an OLG model, we explain economic inequality in Japan, and review
the research on the relationship between income risk and consumption inequality in the
literature. In this paper, we consider two aspects of economic inequality: the life cycle
dimension and the time series dimension. As a life cycle dimension, we focus on earning,
income, and consumption inequality by age, and as a time series dimension we consider
the transitional dynamics of earning, income, and consumption inequality over time.
Given the limited availability of micro data, there are not many empirical studies
on economic inequality in Japan. In particular, there exist few available data set for
consumption inequality. Ohtake and Saito (1998) and Abe and Yamada (2006) estimate
the variance of log income and consumption, based on The National Survey of Family
Income and Expenditure (NSFIE), which is conducted every ﬁve years by the Statistical
Bureau of the Japanese Government. The NSFIE is a large survey with a sample size of
about 50,000, which makes it one of the largest household surveys in the world.6 Ohtake
and Saito (1998) used the surveys of 1979, 1984, and 1989, and Abe and Yamada (2006)
used those of 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999.
6Ohtake and Saito (1998) used samples of households with two or more members, engaged in non-
agricultural sectors, and heads aged 22–75. Abe and Yamada (2006) used the samples of households
with two or more members, male household heads aged 25-70, engaged in non-agricultural sectors or
self-employed or a company director, and the household who have fewer than nine households members.
Each sample contains over 40,000 households. For detailed description of the NSFIE, see Abe and
Yamada (2006).
6We denote income for individual i at age j as yi
j, and also denote the household’s




j,t = β0,t + f(Xi,t,β 1,t)+ei
j.
In Panel (a) of Figure 1, from Abe and Yamada (2006), we show the variance of residuals
obtained from the income regression stated above, which represents the life cycle dimen-
sion of income risk. In Panel (b) of Figure 1, we also plot the age proﬁle of consumption
inequality, constructed in the same way. From a life cycle point of view, income inequal-
ity rises by age in Japan. This observation is consistent with the empirical research by
Storesletten et al. (2004a,b), who show that income and consumption inequality rises
by age in the US. However, the shapes of the two age-variance proﬁles are not similar
each other. Following Storesletten et al. (2004a), the variance of log-income increases
almost linearly in the US, and the consumption variance proﬁle is concave over age. In
Japan, however, the consumption variance proﬁle is convex over age: the variance of
consumption is ﬂat, or rather decreases, when households are young, and rises sharply
after middle age.
Panel (c) and Panel (d) of Figure 1 show the time path of income and consumption
inequality between 1979 and 1999, and indicate that the economic inequality of the time
series dimension in Japan has also risen in recent decades.8 To focus on the trend of
economic inequality, we plot the percentage deviation from the mean. Using the same
data from the NSFIE for 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999, Kohara and Ohtake (2006) also
estimate before-tax income and consumption inequality over time.9 Recent empirical
7The control variables include dummy variables for the number of household members, area infor-
mation, employment status of the household head, the number of employed household members, the
industry the household head is employed in, and the type of job. For more detailed information, see
Table 1 in Abe and Yamada (2006).
8Ohtake and Saito (1998) ﬁnd that a large fraction of rise in income inequality in 1980s is due to
population ageing.
9The deﬁnition of income used by Kohara and Ohtake (2006) includes, in addition to the earnings,
7studies in the US, such as Krueger and Perri (2005) and Heathcote et al. (2004,2008)
ﬁnd that income inequality rises sharply in the 1980s, and stays higher level in the
1990s. Interestingly, the consumption inequality does not increases as much as income
inequality. Compared with the estimation by Heathcote et al. (2004,2008), the rise of
income inequality compares favorably with that in the US, and the positive trend of
consumption inequality is slightly more moderate in Japan.
2.2 Idiosyncratic Income Risk
The estimation of income risks is extensively examined in the literature.10 Since panel
data over a long period, such as the PSID, are available in the US, many researchers
estimate income risks by specifying a stochastic process. For example, Storesletten et
al. (2004b) estimate the income risk by developing a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator and a variation in the cross-sectional variance between households.
Storesletten et al. (2004a,b) decompose the residual ei
j into three factors: (a) a ﬁxed
eﬀect αi, (b) a persistent shock ηi
j, and (c) a transitory shock zi
j. They estimate the
variances of these shocks {σ2
α,σ2
η,j,σ2































t} are time-varying loading factors for measuring the size of each shock
over the business cycle.11
interest and dividend income. Since the interest and dividend income in the NSFIE in the sample is too
small, Kohara and Ohtake (2006) compute the capital income from asset holdings (bank deposit) and
the average interest rate.
10The research described below focuses on the natures of the income process, not on the causes of
income inequality. With regard to the causes of income dispersion, for example, Acemoglu (2002)
emphasizes the role of technological change.
11It would be possible to include time eﬀects and cohort eﬀects in equation (1). Heathcote et al. (2005)
8Using the PSID, Storesletten et al. (2004b) showed that the autocorrelation coef-
ﬁcient ρ is at a highly persistent level of 0.95 in the US, which is consistent with the






t}. Ohtake and Saito (1998) show that the variance of the
logarithm of income increases with age in Japan as in the US. Moreover, the slope of the
variance also increases over age 50. This observation implies that the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient ρ may be over one in Japan. In fact, Abe and Yamada (2006) estimate the
stochastic process (2) using the variance structure in Japan, and ﬁnd that it is over one.
2.3 LC-PIH and Consumption Inequality
Following the income risk speciﬁcation of equations (1) and (2), it is well known from
the LC-PIH that each shock has diﬀerent implications for consumption inequality. If
ﬁxed eﬀects such as educational background are large, there may be high consumption
inequality because such a shock is uninsurable through the saving or insurance markets.
On the contrary, a transitory shock has little eﬀect on consumption inequality because
of consumption smoothing over a period, if insurance markets function eﬀectively or the
amount of precautionary saving is suﬃcient.12
Following these ideas, Heathcote et al. (2004) investigate the relationship between
income risk and consumption inequality in the US, using a dynamic general equilibrium
framework. In the US, there was a sharp rise in income inequality in the 1980s. However,
according to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, consumption inequality did not increase
show that the time eﬀects largely account for the observed trends in inequality in the US, whereas the
cohort eﬀects are less important.
12If insurance markets are complete, the marginal utilities of all households coincide, and the growth
rates of the individual’s consumption are proportional to aggregate consumption. Based on this the-
oretical result, Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoﬀ (1996) test the complete market hypothesis in the U.S.
Attanasio and Davis (1996) reveal that the insurance market works if the shock is temporary, but that
infrequent shocks are not shared. Moreover, Kohara et al. (2002) test the complete market hypothesis
in Japan.
9signiﬁcantly in the same period. On the basis of the income risk model stated above,
these facts can be explained by the increase in the size of the transitory shock ξt
t.I ft h e
transitory shock is large, income inequality appears to rise, although the corresponding
consumption inequality does not change from the LC-PIH. On the other hand, the period
of rising consumption inequality can be explained by the increase in the size of the ﬁxed




t }. From the same observation, Blundell et al.
(2008) show that income dispersion and lack of dispersion in consumption inequality stem
from the partial insurance of permanent shocks. Krueger and Perri (2005) show that,
even if the income risk disperses in the model with limited commitment, consumption
inequality does not necessarily disperse in the model, or in empirical studies.
These studies emphasis the link between income risk and consumption inequality.
However, they do not consider the importance of macroeconomic factors such as TFP
growth. In this paper, given the idiosyncratic income risk in Japan, we consider whether
such macroeconomic factors generate economic inequality in recent decades in Japan.
3 Overlapping Generations Model
We used an OLG model with a continuum of heterogeneous households, developed by
Aiyagari (1994) and extended to a life cycle model by Huggett (1996).
3.1 Demographics
We considered the OLG model with long-living households.13 Households enter the
economy at age 20 and live to a maximum age of 100. However, they face mortality
risk and may die before the age of 100. μj,t denotes the population at age j ∈J=
13Our model includes population dynamics and the time variation of total factor productivity. Thus,
to numerically solve the model, we need to remove the trends of all macroeconomic variables by the
growth rates. For details, see Appendix.
10{0,...,100} at time t. In the next period, a fraction of the households (1 − φj,t)d i e s
and exits the economy. Thus, the size of each cohort evolves as follows:
μj+1,t+1 = sj,tμj,t
We denote the population growth rate of age 0 from time t to t +1a sψt.T h u s ,
the new population at period t + 1 is determined from μ0,t+1 =( 1+ψt)μ0,t. Because
households are in their childhood at j =0 ,1,...,19, they do not engage in consumption
or employment, but they are included in the population dynamics for computing the
future fertility rate.
3.2 Household Behavior
A household that enters the economy at time t elastically supplies labor until the age of
65.14 The utility function of the household that entered the economy at age 20 in period
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,s 19,t =1 ,
14Braun et al. (2007) consider time-variation in the family scale in their model. Moreover, Heathcote
et al. (2008) include education and intra-family time allocation in their model, and investigate wage
inequality. We assume that the household consists of the male household head, and we omit the female
labor supply and family structure from the model. Therefore, as will be discussed later, the parameters
in our model will be calibrated for the husband’s labor. The survival probability is also taken from that
of the male.
15Some empirical researches report that, based on microeconomic data, labor-leisure choice of house-
holds is consistent with a separable utility function between consumption and leisure (See Browining,
et al., 1999). However, because we consider a growth economy, in order to maintain consistency of the
macroeconomic data, we need to adopt the Cobb-Douglas utility function. As is well known, the aggre-
gate labor supply has no trend even if the economy grows. If we adopt a separable utility function with
consumption and leisure, the aggregate labor supply declines as the economy grows. The only exception
is the separable type with log utility function on consumption. We explore the separability on our results
in Section 6.
11where β>0 is a discount factor, γ represents a parameter for intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, σ is a parameter for the share of consumption and leisure, ¯ ht is the
time endowment, and hj,t ∈ [0,¯ ht] is labor supply at age j. We assume that the time
endowment depends on period t, because we want to consider the eﬀect of the reduction
in work hours (referred as jitan) in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Each household faces idiosyncratic risks with regard to labor skill. The labor skill
realized at age j is denoted by ej ∈ E and it ej is assumed to follow the stochastic process
of equations (1) and (2). Labor skill, which consists of the ﬁxed eﬀect, the persistent
shock and the transitory shock, represents the state of a household, sj = {α,z,ε}.O n t h e
other hand, because average earning is observed to be hump-shaped across age groups,
the average productivity of labor for each age is denoted as {κj}
65
j=20. Therefore, when
a household supplies hours hj,t, its earning before tax is yj,t = wtκjejhj,t,w h e r ewt is
the wage rate of the macroeconomy.
The government provides social security beneﬁts through a constant payroll tax on
labor earnings, and retired households receive social security beneﬁt. The payroll tax
rate is τss
t , and the retired households receive a constant amount ϕtwtHt. As will be
explained later, the population-adjusted average earning of workers is denoted by wtHt,
and ϕt is a replacement rate. Thus, we assume that all retired households receive a
constant fraction of the working household’s labor income. Since the households face a
mortality risk, they may die with accidental bequests. We assume, for simplicity, that
the government levies 100% tax on all accidental bequests, and distributes it equally
to all households. The redistributed accidental bequest is denoted as bt.W ei m p o s ea
capital income tax τ
cap
t on the interest rate.
The budget constraints of workers and retirees are as follows:
cj,t + aj+1,t+1 =( 1+( 1− τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+( 1− τss
t )wtκjejhj,t, :W o r k e r
cj,t + aj+1,t+1 =( 1+( 1− τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+ϕtwtHt, : Retiree
12where rt is the interest rate at time t. We impose the liquidity constraint aj,t ≥ 0o n
saving aj,t.
3.3 Firm’s Behavior and Factor Prices






where At is the time-varying total factor productivity (TFP) at time t, Kt is aggregate
capital, and Ht is aggregate labor, which coincides with the average labor income of
workers. θt is capital share, which is also dependent on time t. We assume that the
sequence of TFP is deterministic and perfectly forecastable. Thus, there is no aggregate
risk in the model.
Because of the idiosyncratic income risk, households of the same cohort may have
diﬀerent wealth holdings and diﬀerent labor supply, depending on the realization of the
income shocks. Denote the density function of age j in time t with asset holding a and
the idiosyncratic income state s as Φt (a,s,j). Then aggregate capital Kt and aggregate










Aggregate capital depreciates at the rate δt. Then, the interest rate rt and wage wt of
time t are determined as follows:
rt = θtAt (Kt/Ht)
θt−1 − δt,w t =( 1− θt)At (Kt/Ht)
θt . (4)
3.4 Government’s Budget Constraints
In our model, the government has three roles: (1) collecting payroll tax for social security
and managing the social security system, (2) collecting capital income tax and using it
13for government expenditure, and (3) distributing accidental bequests. The payroll tax
for social security is endogenously determined, depending on the replacement rate ϕt.








Government expenditure, which does not yield utility, is based on the capital income













(1 − φj,t)aj,tdΦt(a,s,j). (7)
3.5 Deﬁnition of a Competitive Equilibrium
The deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium is as follows.
Deﬁnition (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium): Given the paths of TFP {At},
the time endowment {¯ ht}, the capital share {θt}, the depreciation rate {δt},t h e
capital income tax rate {τ
cap
t }, and the replacement rate {ϕt}, the recursive com-
petitive equilibrium is a set of the policy functions {gc
t,gh
t ,ga
t }, aggregate capital
{Kt}, aggregate labor {Ht}, factor prices {rt,w r},p a y r o l lt a xr a t e s{τss
t },a n dt h e
accidental bequest {bt} which satisfy the following conditions:
• A Household’s Optimality: Given factor prices {rt,w r} and payroll tax rates {τss
t },
the household maximizes expected utility, and the functions {gc
t,gh
t ,ga
t } are the
associated policy functions.
16In the speciﬁcation, an increase in the capital income tax rate directly implies the reduction of house-
hold utility. However, welfare comparison is beyond the scope of our purpose. Thus, our speciﬁcation
does not cause any problem in our analysis. The capital income tax rate plays a crucial role on matching
the saving rate of the model to the data.
14• A Firm’s Optimality: Factor prices are competitively determined by equation (4).
• Market Clearing: The market clearing conditions of equation (3) are satisﬁed.17
• The Government’s Budget: The government budget constraints (5) and (6) are
satisﬁed.
• Accidental Bequest: Accidental bequests are redistributed as in (7).
• Transition Law of Motion: The distribution function Φt (a,s,j) transits consis-
tently with the policy functions.
Following Conesa and Krueger (1999), we compute initial and ﬁnal stationary states
as a ﬁrst step, and then we compute the transition path between them.
4 Calibration
4.1 Fundamental Parameters
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implications of macroeconomic factors,
a demographic factor, and income risk factors for economic inequality in Japan, by
replicating the Japanese economy from 1980 to 2000. As a target, we choose the model
parameters for the Japanese economy in 1980.18
Although we assume that households must retire at age 65, the actual mandatory
retirement age in Japan in 1980 was around 60. However, because of the steep decline
in average labor productivity after 60, many households voluntarily retire around 60.
The available time endowment for labor supply ¯ ht is assumed that, in the early 1980s,
all households have 16 hours × 5.5 days × 4 weeks × 12 months. Hayashi and Prescott
17According to Walras’ law, a good market clears if the remaining capital and labor markets clear.
18For robustness, we also computed the transition path between 1970 and 2000, and found that the
diﬀerence does not change our results.
15(2002) show that, since a reduction in work hours was introduced by law in the late
1980s, the average work hours per week fell from 44 hours to 40. To replicate this
fact, we assume that the time endowment reduces from 1988 to 1993 and after 1993 all
households worked ﬁve days per week, i.e., 16 hours × 5d a y s× 4 weeks × 12 months.
We set the share parameter for consumption and leisure at σ =0 .55, which implies that
average work hours per year become 2000 − 2200 hours in our model.
We set the intertemporal elasticity parameter γ at 2. In this calibration, the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution becomes 0.5, and the relative risk aversion is
1 − σ(1 − γ)=1 .55. These values are within the plausible range in the existing lit-
erature on the real business cycle. The discount factor β is chosen to be β =0 .9871
for matching the capital-output ratio of the model between 1980 and 2000 to the actual
data. Following Oshio and Yashiro (1997), the replacement rate of social security in
Japan in the 1990s was about 40% . Thus, we set the replacement parameter ϕt to
match this fact.
4.2 Income Risk and Age-Eﬃciency Proﬁle
As stated in Section 2, the idiosyncratic skill shock ej follows equations (1) and (2). The
income risk parameters {σ2
α,σ2
η,j,σ2
ε} are calibrated to match the cross-section variance
proﬁles of the logarithms of income in Panel (a) of Figure 1. Based on equations (1) and
(2), the variances of the ﬁxed eﬀect and the transitory shock determine the intercept of
the proﬁle, and the slope of the proﬁle is determined by the variance of the persistent
shock and the persistence parameter.19
Since the age proﬁle of variance of log consumption is convex over age, Abe and
Yamada (2006) report that they do not reject the possibility of ρ ≥ 1. However, since it
would be diﬃcult to compute the model with ρ ≥ 1, we assume that the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient is very close to one, and approximate it to the Markov chain. We choose
19For details, see Storesletten et al. (2004a,b).
16ρ =0 .98 and ση20 =0 .05 and assume that the standard deviation of the persistent shock
increases by 0.0005. After the speciﬁcation of the AR(1) process, we approximate the
process by the seven-state Markov chain from Tauchen’s (1986) method. The standard
deviation of the ﬁxed eﬀect σα and the transitory shock σε are set at 0.25 and 0.03,
respectively, because the variance of log-income at age 25 is approximately 0.1. Both
are approximated by two-states as {e−σ,e σ}. To make the model tractable, we assume
that the idiosyncratic income risk parameters are constant for all time. Although this
may seem a strong assumption, Ohtake and Saito (1998) and Abe and Yamada (2006)
report that the variance proﬁles of log income/consumption over life cycle do not change
signiﬁcantly from 1984 to 1999. In Section 5, we will discuss whether this calibration
really explains Japanese inequality.
The average productivity proﬁle over age {κj} corresponds to the average hourly
wage for each age. Following Hansen (1993) and Braun et al. (2007), and using the
Basic Survey in Wage Structure by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, we
compute the average hourly wage (eﬃciency-unit wage) for all age classes. Table 2
shows the average hourly wages for workers in ﬁve-year age groups. We compute {κj}
by smoothing the average hourly wage. Since we assume that the male head of the
household supplies labor, the average hourly wage is based on the male’s wage. We use
the average wage proﬁle in the 1990s.
4.3 Demographic Structure
We choose the demographic parameters to replicate the actual and projected population
dynamics. The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR)
provides recent population projections from 2006 to 2055. We set the survival probability
{φj,t}2055
t=2006 from the life table estimated using the NIPSSR’s estimates in 2005, and
{φj,t}2005
t=2000 are taken from the NIPSSR’s estimates in 2002. The survival probabilities
17from 1980 to 1999 are extrapolated from the survival probability of the life table.20
Since population growth {ψt} in our model is represented by the growth rate of 0-year
old children, we use the ratio of the projected population of new born people between
period t and t+1. The population projection displays three variants of estimation: low,
medium, and high variants for fertility and mortality rates.21 Therefore, there are nine
variations in all. We use medium variants of both the fertility and mortality rates.22
The calibrated population growth rates between 1980 and 2005 are those of the realized
values.
The population distribution in the model moves from 1980 to 2055 following the
projected and the realized values, and the population growth rate is assumed to converge
to zero after the transition period. However, the convergence rate is slow, and it takes
approximately 100 years to reach a new stationary population distribution. Thus, we
choose 2200 as the ﬁnal stationary state. Following Braun et al. (2007), we assume that
the population growth rate converges to zero, ψt = 0, between 2056 and 2065.
There arises the problem of how to choose an initial population distribution in the
initial stationary state. The actual population distribution in 1980 does not appear
to be stationary because of the existence of the baby-boomer generations. However, a
population distribution is required to compute the initial stationary state. For simplicity,
we assume that the households in our model believe that the actual population in 1980
is stationary.
20Another way of obtaining the survival probability of realized years is to calculate them from the
population distribution of recent years. However, since the new population distribution includes immi-
grants, the population size of age j +1atperiodt+1 may be larger than that of age j at period t.T h i s
contradicts the model’s assumption. Thus, we use the life table.
21For details, see the following website: http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/Popular/Popular2008.asp?chap=0.
22The diﬀerences between each projection make little diﬀerence to the income and consumption in-
equality of our model between 1980 to 2000.
184.4 Macroeconomic Factors
Finally, we need exogenously given macroeconomic variable paths. For the purpose of
comparison, the paths of all macroeconomic factors are taken from Hayashi and Prescott




t =1+gt between 1980 to
2000 are estimated by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and re-estimated from Hayashi and
Prescott’s (2002) data if the capital share is time-varying.24 Although the TFP factor
growth after 2000 could be estimated by macro data, we unfortunately have no data on
economic inequality in Japan after 2000. Therefore, we simply assume that the TFP
factor growth rate converges after 2000. The converged TFP factor growth rate is the
average TFP growth rate of 1960–2000, which is 2%, following Braun et al. (2007).
The TFP level A1980 is normalized to make the equilibrium wage w1980 equal to one.
The capital share {θt}, the depreciation rate {δt}, and the capital income tax {τ
cap
t }
are also taken from the estimated data of Hayashi and Prescott (2002).25 These values
are assumed to converge to their average in the 1990s for ten years after 2000.26 All
calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 3.
23Data and the details are available from http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/˜hayashi/Hayashi-
Prescott1.htm.
24There is some skeptism about low TFP growth in the 1990s. Kawamoto (2004) points out that the
estimation by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) does not necessarily imply the pure eﬀect of productivity.
Moreover, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) demonstrate that a liquidity constraint on investment,
for example, may lead to a decline in the TFP that apparently does not reﬂect productivity. Therefore,
it may not be correct to consider time-varying TFP as a macroeconomic productivity shock. However,
for our purposes, it does not matter, because the TFP movement in our model may cause inequality
whether or not there is actually a productivity shock. We will consider the interpretation of the TFP
shock on economic inequality in our next research. Our calibration targets, such as interest rate, are taken
from the estimation data of Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Thus, for consistency, for all macroeconomic
variables we use Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
25Hayashi and Prescott (2002) deﬁne the capital income tax as direct tax on corporate income, 50%
of indirect business tax, and 8% of operating surplus.
26We conﬁrm that a small change in the converged points does not change our results.
195 Quantitative Results
5.1 Macroeconomic Variables: First Moments
Before discussing economic inequality after 1980, we conﬁrm whether the average paths,
such as interest rate and saving rate in the model, replicates the Japanese economy.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the after-tax interest rate in the model and the data. Since
the capital income tax rate, taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002), is over 40%, the
before-tax interest rate is over 10% in the late 1980s. Compared with the data, the
endogenously determined interest rate closely replicates the data, although the model
falls slightly below the data in the early 1990s. Panel (b) of Figure 2 plots the capital-
output ratio K/Y . The model replicates the ﬂat capital-output ratio in the 1980s and
the capital deepening process in the lost decade.
In addition to the time variation of the TFP growth rate, Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) emphasizes the eﬀect of the reduction in work hours in the late 1980s when
explaining macroeconomic dynamics in Japan. Panel (c) of Figure 2 represents yearly
work hours. Because the level of work hours is slightly higher in the model than in
the data, we normalize the work hour of year 1980 to one. Since the available time
endowment ¯ ht is assumed to decline from 1988 to 1993, the endogenously determined
work hours decreases during this period. According to Hayashi and Prescott (2002),
since the work hours per week were reduced from 44 hours/week to 40 hours/week, the
reduction amounts to about 9.1%. In our model, since there is a corresponding reduction
of about 10.4%, our model closely replicates the reduction of work hours. In addition,
the work hours of the model after 1993 also trace the data. However, because we assume
perfect foresight, the work hours in the model increase between 1985 and 1988. For
the purpose of intertemporal substitution, households increase labor supply during the
period, since they predict the future reduction in time endowment. Thus, for the period
of before time reduction, the time path of the model deviates from the data.
20Lastly, we focus on the saving rate of the data and the model. Chen et al. (2006,2007)
and Braun et al. (2007) show that the time variation of TFP growth and population
dynamics are crucial contributing factors in explaining the Japanese saving rate after
WW II. Compared to Braun et al. (2007), we extend the model by including idiosyncratic
income risk.27 We plot the time series of the national saving rate in Panel (d) of Figure
2. The model appears to explain the saving rate before the mid-1990s very clearly.
However, there is a discrepancy between the data and model in the period 1995–1997.28
In conclusion, using the overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic income risk
and exogenously given macroeconomic factors, the dynamic general equilibrium model
can explain the data very clearly.
5.2 Income and Consumption Inequality over Life Cycle
Figure 3 plots the variance of logarithm of income and consumption over age given a
calibrated parameter set of idiosyncratic income risks {ρ,σ2
α,σ2
η,j,σ2
ε}. As a target of the
calibration, we also plot the variance of log income and consumption in 1984 and 1999
provided by Abe and Yamada (2006). From Panel (a) of Figure 3, we conﬁrm that our
numerical model closely replicates the income inequality.
From Panel (a) of Figure 3, it appears that the variance of log income increases by
age, and that the slope also increases after 50. Our model clearly explains the income
inequality of the cross-sectional dimension, except for the sharp rise after age 55. In
contrast, in Panel (a) of Figure 3, the consumption inequality in old age is small in the
model, although its consumption inequality around ages 25–40 matches the data, closely.
Thus, the idiosyncratic income risks in the model are eﬀectively shared by saving, which
27In contrast, Braun et al. (2007) consider family structure in their analysis.
28Most Asian countries, including Japan, experienced a ﬁnancial crisis in 1997. In such a period,
many Japanese households may face a serious liquidity constraint that may not be well represented
in our model. From a simulation study, Ogawa (2007) shows that the saving rate declined by several
percentage points as a result of liquidity constraints.
21implies that consumption inequality becomes slightly lower. Although it is diﬃcult to
explain the consumption inequality of life cycle aspect perfectly, the overall level of the
consumption variance, and the slopes of the proﬁles in the model, is similar to those in
the estimates.
5.3 Evolution of Earning and Income Inequality
We plot earning and income inequality in the model between 1980 and 2004 in Panels (a)
and (b) of Figure 4. To compute economic inequality, in Section 2, we used the variance
of the logarithm of variables. For comparison, we also plot the evolution of the variance
of log income and consumption, estimated from Ohtake and Saito (1998) and Kohara
and Ohtake (2006). It is diﬃcult to match exactly the level of these variances because
of the deﬁnitions of consumption and income.29 Therefore, we use the time paths of
the percentage deviation from mean. To compare our model with Kohara and Ohtake’s
(2006) result, the deﬁnition of income in our model adds interest income (1−τ
cap
t )rtaj,t
to labor earning yj,t (Figure 4(b)). The earning inequality in Panel (a) of Figure 4 is
the variance of the logarithm of labor earning yj,t.
Based on two previous researches, we know that the variance of log income has a
positive trend since 1980. Although the deﬁnition of income inequality used by Kohara
and Ohtake (2006) is not consistent with our model, the slopes of the data and the
model are close to each other in the earning inequality path. Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows
that the simulation data between 1984 and 1999 show a strong positive trend; thus the
evolution of earning inequality matches the data in this period. Because the interest
29For example, family structure, female labor supply, and diﬀerence between durables and nondurables
are omitted from the model. Moreover, we do not consider a progressive income tax. Thus, it is
impossible to compare the data and the model exactly, because of the diﬀerences in deﬁnition. In the
model, the average of variance of log income is about 0.39, and for the corresponding data it is 0.32.
The average of the variance of log consumption in the data is about 0.25, whereas the corresponding
value in the model is only 0.21.
22rate in this period is near zero, due to the zero interest rate policy adopted by the Bank
of Japan, the income inequality estimated by Kohara and Ohtake (2006) may be close
to the earning inequality. If so, our model explains the transition of earning inequality
in Japan in the 1990s. The model fails, however, to explain the rise of inequality in
the early 1980s. One possible reason for the failure to match wage inequality is that, in
the model, the households can predict the reduction of the time endowment.30 Thus,
households prepared for the reduction by increasing labor supply in the early 1980s.
This implies a concentration of high labor supply and small earning inequality.
Income inequality is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 4. Although both the model and
the data show a positive trend from the 1980s to 1990s, the inequality in the data rises
sharply compared to that in the model. The positive trend of income inequality in the
model starts to decline in the mid 1990s. In this period, the corresponding saving rate
in the model is higher than in the data. In Japan in the late 1990s, many households
suﬀered from the serious recession, and decumulated their wealth. As a result, the
income inequality in the data in this period may show dispersion.
5.4 Evolution of Consumption Inequality
Panel (c) of Figure 4 shows the transition path of consumption inequality, and also de-
picts the data obtained by Ohtake and Saito (1998), Kohara and Ohtake (2006), and
the simulated model.31,32 This ﬁgure also plots the deviation from mean. According to
30Another route that may aﬀect household’s decision on labor and consumption is the wealth eﬀect
of the time endowment. Our speciﬁcation of the time-varying time endowment process implies the
reduction of total wealth for workers, and this changes decisions on labor and consumption. However,
it is diﬃcult to remove the wealth eﬀect from our model.
31As noted above, it is very diﬃcult to deﬁne consumption precisely, because we need to consider
family structure, durable goods, housing, etc. For details on the deﬁnition of consumption, see Ohtake
and Saito (1998) and Kohara and Ohtake (2006).
32We deﬁne consumption inequality in the model for households aged between 20 to 80. Since the
NSFIE surveys are based on household heads, there are very few samples in which the household head
23previous studies, consumption inequality also has a positive trend, although the path is
ﬂatter than that of income inequality. In our simulation, and excluding the rise between
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, consumption inequality does not appear to have a
positive trend. This seems surprising because both population aging and the macroeco-
nomic variables changed in this period, and, as a result, earning inequality ﬂuctuated.
This implies that households in the model carry out very eﬀective consumption smooth-
ing, and that the idiosyncratic shocks are shared through saving, which is also observed
in Figure 3. Figure 3(b) shows that the age-proﬁle of log consumption variance in the
model is ﬂatter than in the data. As a result, the eﬀect of population aging may be
underestimated. Although earning inequality rises from the 1980s to mid-1990s in the
model, it does not lead to consumption inequality. Thus inequality in the 1980s is not
clearly explained by the model.
From the above, we can safely say that the dynamic general equilibrium model clearly
explains income and earning inequality in Japan. However, unlike these two inequalities,
the consumption inequality of the data is diﬃcult to match with that of the model. Since
consumption inequality has direct implications for economic welfare, we need to consider
the omitted factors on consumption inequality. One possible explanation is that the size





t} has changed through time, and the uninsurable
component of the idiosyncratic income risk has become larger.
5.5 On the Eﬀect of Macroeconomic Factors: A Counterfactual Simu-
lation
Since our model is complex, it is diﬃcult to analyze it theoretically. Instead, using
counterfactual simulations, we consider how the income and consumption inequalities
change if the macroeconomic factors such as the TFP factor growth rate and time
endowment, are constant over time.
is over 80. We conﬁrm that including households aged over 80 in the model does not change our results.
24In Figure 5, we depict the evolution of the earning and consumption inequalities, if
the TFP factor growth rates are constant at 2%, or if time endowment {¯ ht} is constant
at the average of the 1990s.33 In keeping with Hayashi and Prescott (2002), the TFP
growth rate and the reduction in work hours both have a large impact on the path. From
Panel (a) of Figure 5, we ﬁnd that, if the time endowment is constant over time, the
rise in earning inequality between 1988 and 1993 is small, and the path over the entire
period is ﬂat. If the TFP growth rate is constant then, except for the early 1980s, earning
inequality becomes higher in comparison to the benchmark case. Therefore, these two
macroeconomic factors have signiﬁcant eﬀect not only on the ﬁrst moment, e.g., GDP
or saving rate, but also on the second moment of the economy. We also examine the
cases of constant capital share, capital income tax, and depreciation rate path, but their
eﬀect is very small.
We compare consumption inequality in Panel (b) of Figure 5. The reduction in work
hours has a large impact on consumption inequality. The sharp rise of consumption
inequality between the late 1980s and the early 1990s is due to the reduction in work
hours. The reduction of the time endowment implies that there is less room for smooth-
ing marginal utility by changing leisure, and this leads to consumption inequality. If the
TFP growth rate is constant at 2%, then consumption inequality in the period of the
so-called lost decade is higher than in the benchmark case. Thus, the low TFP growth
rate in the lost decade implies low earning and consumption inequality.
The mechanism behind the impact of macroeconomic factors on inequality is as
follows. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show that income and consumption inequality over the
life cycle are almost constant, i.e., ergodic, over time. On the other hand, the time path
of income/consumption inequality changes signiﬁcantly. If the macroeconomic factors
are constant over time and there is no demographic change, then the time path of
33We omit the counterfactual simulation of the income inequality path because the economic implica-
tions of macroeconomic factors are similar to those of earning inequality.
25income/consumption inequality is ﬂat over time, because lifetime inequality is ergodic
in the model. On the contrary, if the TFP growth rate is high in a period, some cohorts
decide to increase work hours and consumption, depending on their remaining lifetime.
The growth rates of work hours and consumption are not the same, due to diﬀerent age
or diﬀerent state, and as a result, the ﬂuctuating TFP growth rate leads to the dynamics
of macroeconomic inequality, even if life cycle inequality is the same for all cohorts.
5.6 Demographics versus Macroeconomic Variables
Next, we discuss the eﬀects of the demographic factor and the macroeconomic factors on
economic inequality. The label denoted as “Population” in Figure 6 is the counterfactual
simulation with constant population distribution, but the macroeconomic variables are
exogenously given calibrated parameters. The label denoted as “Macro” is the simulated
results in which the macroeconomic variables are constant over time, but the population
is aging.
If there is no population aging, income inequality ﬂattens over the period: income
inequality declines slightly in the 1980s, whereas earning inequality becomes more U-
shaped. These imply that the rise in income and earning inequality in the 1990s is
partially due to the population aging eﬀect. However, even without population aging,
there remains a positive trend of earning and income inequality. In contrast, if all the
macroeconomic factors are constant over time, earning inequality peaks in the mid-1990s,
and declines in the late 1990s. In conclusion, both the aging and the macroeconomic
factors create a positive trend of earning inequality. In particular, the increase in income
and earning inequality in the late 1990s is due to macroeconomic factors. Consumption
inequality, in Panel (c) of Figure 6, also reveals the importance of the macroeconomic
factors. Without macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, the time path of consumption inequality
becomes hump-shaped at the peak in the mid-1990s. The time path becomes very
smooth and declines after the peak. On the other hand, consumption inequality rises
26sharply after 1990 in the simulation labeled “Population.” Thus, the positive trend of
consumption inequality is also explained by aging and by the macroeconomic factors.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Separability of Utility Function
Our speciﬁcation of utility function is standard in the macroeconomics literature, be-
cause we used the Cobb–Douglas form. However, because we employ a time varying
time endowment, the nonseparability of the marginal utility of consumption and leisure
may cause problems when considering consumption inequality. Note that, because we
consider a growth economy, the utility function needs to be consistent with no aggregate
labor trend. To investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings, we consider the separable
utility function. If the parameter γ is equal to 1, then the utility function becomes as
follows:
u(cj,t,¯ ht − hj,t)=σlogcj,t +( 1− σ)log(¯ ht − hj,t).
In this form, due to its separability, leisure has no eﬀect on the marginal utility of
consumption.34 In addition to the log case, we consider the case of γ =4 .
In Figures 7(a) and 7(b), we plot the simulated earning and consumption inequality
with the log utility and γ = 4. If the temporary utility function is of log-type, then
the earning and consumption inequality proﬁles become steeper. Thus, compared to
the benchmark case in Figure 4, the matching of the model to the data may improve,
especially in consumption. In the benchmark case, a rise of consumption inequality in
the data cannot be explained well by the model. On the contrary, in the log utility case,
the sharp rise in consumption inequality in the 1990s is closer to the data. Against that,
high gamma implies a less positive trend of inequality. Because the high and low gamma
cases consistently move in all cases, the separability does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect in
our analysis.
34For more general separable utility forms, see King et al. (1998) and Basu and Kimball (2002).
276.2 On the Eﬀect of Social Security System
Lastly, we conﬁrm whether our speciﬁcation of social security is signiﬁcant when con-
sidering the time path of economic inequality. In Figures 7(c) and 7(d), we consider a
reduction by half of the replacement rate compared to the benchmark case, i.e., ϕ =0 .2.
Our speciﬁcation of the social security form has redistribution and insurance eﬀects, and
thus reduces economic inequality. Panel (c) of Figure 7 shows that earning inequality
does not change even if the replacement rate is small. Therefore, such a social security
reform does not change the distribution of earnings and work hours signiﬁcantly. In
contrast, the time path of consumption decreases in the 1980s and increases after the
mid 1990s. This is interesting, because recently it has been widely recognized that rapid
aging worsens the sustainability and credibility of the social security system in Japan.
If households predict that the social security payments that they expect to receive will
become smaller, then the consumption inequality will disperse, even if the corresponding
earning inequality does not change, compared to the benchmark case.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated the evolution of economic inequality in Japan between
1980 and 2000, using a dynamic general equilibrium model. To analyze the inequality,
we consider the quantitative impacts of macroeconomic factors and a demographic factor.
In addition to such macroeconomic variables as the interest rate and the saving rate,
our model could explain time variation of the variance of log earning and consumption;
thus, an OLG model with heterogeneous households would be a suitable benchmark for
understanding the transitional dynamics in the Japanese economy. In this respect, we
consider our result an extension of the result obtained by Hayashi and Prescott (2002),
which explains the causes of the lost decade using a standard neoclassical growth model.
Using counterfactual simulation, we analyzed the reason why economic inequality
28in Japan has risen. We found that the time variation of the TFP growth, and the
reduction in work hours, have implications not only for the macroeconomic variables
but also for economic inequality. In particular, lower TFP growth rate in the 1990s
leads to low economic inequality. Moreover, we found that, even without demographic
factors, such as aging, and the constant idiosyncratic income risk factors, earning and
income inequality declined because of the macroeconomic factors. Based on our analysis,
preference change and distrust of the social security system in Japan may also contribute
to the deterioration of consumption inequality.
There still remain unexplained components on the time path of earning and con-
sumption inequality. This unexplained component should be regarded as the changes
brought about by ﬁxed, persistent, and transitory eﬀects. In addition, we do not consider
the reason why earnings risk and inequality rises. For welfare analysis, we need to con-
sider the causes of rising earning and consumption inequality: for example, skill-biased
technological change or human capital may explain the causes. Kawamoto (2005) points
out that the decline of TFP in 1990s is not due to the low productivity of the Japanese
economy, but to ineﬃcient resource allocation between productive and unproductive sec-
tors. Based on this view, we need to consider sector speciﬁc allocation problems when
we consider economic inequality in the Japanese economy. These are topics for future
research.
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34A Computation Procedure
A household’s optimization problem is as follows:
Vj,t(a,s)=m a x
 




cj,t + aj+1,t+1 =( 1+( 1− τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+( 1− τss
t )wtκjejhj,t,
cj,t + aj+1,t+1 =( 1+( 1− τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+ϕtwtHt.
Because microeconomic variables are not aﬀected by the population trend, we detrend





t =˜ aj,t,a n dhj,t = ˜ hj,t. Then, the normalized Bellman equation becomes as
follows:
vj,t(˜ a,s)=m a x
 




˜ cj,t +( 1+gt)˜ aj+1,t+1 =( 1+( 1− τ
cap
t )rt)(˜ aj,t +˜ bt)+( 1− τss
t )˜ wtκjej˜ hj,t,
˜ cj,t +( 1+gt)˜ aj+1,t+1 =( 1+( 1− τ
cap
t )rt)(˜ aj,t +˜ bt)+˜ ϕ ˜ wt ˜ Ht
where ˜ βt = β(1 + gt)σ(1−γ) and ˜ bt = bt/A
1/(1−θt)
t .
Computing a stationary state is a direct extension of Storesletten et al.’s (2004a)
model. Among the many available procedures for computing the policy function, we
apply the Endogenous Gridpoint Method (EGM) by Carroll (2006), because it is a safe
and relatively fast method.35
After the computation of the stationary state in 1980 and 2200, we compute the
transitional path between the stationary states. The basic idea here is the same as in
Conesa and Krueger (1999).
35For details on the endogenous gridpoint method with endogenous labor supply, see appendix in
Krueger and Ludwig (2006) and Barillas and Fer´ nandez-Villaverde (2006).
351. Given an exogenous path of {˜ ϕ,gt,θ t,δ t,¯ ht,τ
cap
t }2200
t=1980, guess an equilibrium se-
quence of {rt, ˜ wt,τss
t , ˜ Ht,˜ bt}2200
t=1980, which is needed to solve a household’s prob-
lem.36 We assume that the replacement rate, TFP growth rate, capital share,
depreciation rate, time endowment, and capital income tax are all perfectly fore-
seen and exogenously given.
2. Because we have the policy function of the ﬁnal stationary state in 2200, we com-
pute a sequence of policy functions using the EGM by backward induction.
3. Given the policy functions, compute the distribution function from 1980 onwards
and compute aggregate variables, { ˜ Kt, ˜ Ht,r t, ˜ wt}2200
t=1980.
4. Check whether each market clearing condition and government budget balances
are satisﬁed. If these are not in equilibrium, up-date the price sequences and repeat
steps 2 − 3.37
5. If all markets clear in all periods, stop computation.
36For simplicity, we start a linear case.
37There are many eﬃcient methods of updating the price sequence. For example, Krueger and Ludwig
(2006) and Ludwig (2006) use a modiﬁed version of the Gauss-Zeidel method to compute the transition
path.
3670s 80s 90s
TFP Factor Growth Rate (%) 1.40 2.68 0.57
Depreciation Rate (%) 10.19 8.97 8.40
Capital Share 0.3512 0.3536 0.3627
Capital Income Tax Rate (%) 41.55 47.68 44.92
Table 1: Macroeconomic Variables in Japan
37Age Hourly Wage Age Hourly Wage
20–24 1,349 45–49 3,075
25–29 1,777 50–54 3,145
30–34 2,187 55–59 2,797
35–39 2,548 60–64 1,923
40–44 2,842 65– 1,617
Table 2: Average Hourly Wage for Each Age Group; Yen
38Stationary State in 1980
Value Target Statistics and Previous Research
β 0.9871 K/Y ≈ 1.74
γ 2 Frisch Elasticity ≈ 0.67
σ 0.55 Average Hours Worked ≈ 2,200h
ϕ 0.4 Ohio and Yashiro (1997)
¯ h1980 4,224 16h × 5.5days × 4weeks × 12month
θ1980 0.3452 Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
δ1980 0.0949 Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
τ
cap
1980 0.4636 Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
Stationary State in 2200
β 0.9871 Constant over time
γ 2 Frisch Elasticity ≈ 0.63
σ 0.55 Average Hours Worked ≈ 2,000h
ϕ 0.4 Ohio and Yashiro (1997)
¯ h2200 3,840 16h × 5days × 4weeks × 12month
θ2200 0.362 Average of 1990-2000, Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
δ2200 0.083 Average of 1990-2000, Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
τ
cap
2200 0.450 Average of 1990-2000, Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) Consumption Inequality (Variance of Log)
Benchmark
Half Rep. Rate
Figure 7: Robustness Analysis: Utility Function and Replacement Rate
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